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The
IRA cessation is 25 years old this week. August 1994 was an intense month. I
was involved, along with Martin McGuinness, and others in the Sinn Féin
leadership, in intense, mostly private, efforts to persuade the SDLP Leader
John Hume, the Irish Government and allies in Irish America to establish an
alternative unarmed strategy to pursue republican and democratic objectives. Fr
Alec Reid was central to this. And Fr Des.
The Sinn Féin aim was to open up the opportunity
for a meaningful peace process that could bring about fundamental political and
constitutional change. At the same time we were intent on advancing our
republican objectives of ending partition and bringing about Irish Unity.
August 1994 was the month when it all began to come
together. To be honest, neither Martin nor I really knew if we would succeed.
We were attempting something unique and exceptional - to construct a series of
agreements which together could persuade the IRA leadership that there existed
an alternative to armed actions capable of achieving republican goals. The
danger was that if we pulled everything together and the Army said NO then the
process was over before it really started
Our discussions involved the Irish government; I
was meeting John Hume; we were negotiating with the US administration through a
variety of channels, and there was a delegation of Irish Americans – the
Connolly House group – who were lobbying the Clinton administration to develop
a new Irish agenda. We were also in contact with the British government though
they were not part of the effort to develop an alternative.
At a briefing in early August with the IRA
leadership Martin was able to tell it that the Irish government had provided
written assurances that if there was a cessation there would be an immediate
response on practical matters. Sinn Fein would be treated like any other
political party. This would include a speedy meeting between the Taoiseach, Albert
Reynolds, myself and John Hume.
Incidentally, after the cessation was declared and
before that meeting Albert contacted me to say that Seamus Mallon had asked him
to put our meeting back until he met with John Hume and Seamus. I dismissed
this. The Taoiseach did not press it.
The Connolly House group had also passed back to us
a document which set out a serious programme of work and commitment from them
and Irish America. Entitled ‘Policy Statement by Irish American leaders’ it
said that in the event of a ceasefire they would commit themselves to ‘the
creation of a campaign in the United States dedicated to achieving’ a
number of specified goals. Among these were an immediate end to all visa
restrictions and the provision of unrestricted access for the Sinn
Fein party leader.
The IRA leadership listened attentively to what we
had to say. It agreed to meet again to receive an update from us. It was coming
close to make your mind up time. Everyone at the meeting knew this. Some of the
leadership were against a cessation. They had been very frank about that. It
was going to be a close call.
I believed that we had to choreograph a series of
statements, actually more public initiatives than statements, from John Hume,
An Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, and the Connolly House group, which would signal
the coming together of the different pieces of the jig-saw. We also needed a
visa for Joe Cahill. It was one of the issues which the Army leadership had
raised with us. Fundamentally it was a test to see if the Irish government was
prepared to take on the British and if it could win such a political battle
with the British within the US administration. It would also be an important
indicator of how seriously the Clinton administration intended to take the
issue of peace in Ireland.
The Connolly House Group returned to Ireland on
August 25. The following Sunday John Hume and I met and issued another joint
statement. Later that evening the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds issued a statement
in which he also expressed a belief that a historic opportunity was opening up.
Martin and I met the Army Council again. The meeting
was inconclusive. People needed more time to consider all the issues. Joe’s
visa became an even greater test. Then late on Monday night, August 29th,
President Clinton cleared Joe’s visa.
Martin and I again travelled to meet the Army
Council. A package had been agreed. It was now over to the IRA leadership.
Everyone at the Army meeting was a little tense. Martin McGuinness spoke
eloquently. So did others. For and against.
One of Martin’s great
qualities was his sense of conviction and confidence. He could bring a strength
to a debate which was very, very compelling. Even if you might not agree with
him you knew he was going to deliver on any commitment he made or die trying.
The struggle wasn’t ending we told them. They knew that of course.
In many ways, I said, the easy decision was for the
IRA to continue to fight. That was the low risk option. The high-risk option
was the one we were arguing for. It meant uncharted waters. It would involve
compromises. It could mean risking – and losing – everything.
But we could also be the generation who would win freedom. We could set in
place a process which could create new conditions for a genuine and just peace
and from there build a pathway and a strategy into a new all Ireland republic.
A formal proposal was then put to the meeting. The
vote was for a cessation. It was not unanimous but those who voted against
pledged their support to the new position. Unity, they said was essential.
On Wednesday August 31st at noon
the IRA declared its “complete cessation of military operations… We believe
that an opportunity to create a just and lasting settlement has been created”.
The peace process and the dramatic changes that
have taken place in the last 25 years owe much to the courageous decision by
the Army Council and those other Volunteers who followed the path chosen by the
IRA leadership.
A quarter of a century later much has changed.
Ongoing political and demographic changes have increased the demand for more
change. Political Unionism has lost its majority in the Assembly. Nationalism
has rejected Westminster. There is a greater confidence and optimism. The
demand for equality, for rights for all citizens is now part of our DNA.
Support for a referendum on Irish Unity is growing. Nationalists and
republicans will never again tolerate a second class status. Many within
unionism have also come to accept the need for power-sharing and reconciliation
and inclusiveness. And some are publicly speaking for the first time about the
possibility of a new Ireland, a shared space which embraces the unity of all
our people.
There are of course still challenges to be
overcome. Brexit looms. The power sharing government is not functioning. There
are still those within political unionism who see everything as a zero sum game
in which any change – however innocuous – is a defeat. The British government
is allied to the DUP and refusing to honour commitments made when the Good
Friday Agreement was achieved. The Irish government and the southern political
establishment could do much more to fulfill their obligations as co-guarantor
of the Agreement. So, there is still much work to be done.
Looking back twenty five years ago to that period
of our history and experience it is clear that dialogue, inclusive and based on
equality, is central to any conflict resolution process – to any process of
change. It is very telling that the then Leader of Unionism James
Molyneaux described the cessation as ‘The
most destabilising event since partition.’
Twenty five years later this assertion remains an
insightful reminder of the worm at the heart of political unionism. That is the
fear of positive political change. It is self-evident now that if it had
been left to the Unionist leaders and the British Government there would have
not been a cessation.
Thankfully they did not have a vote at the IRA’s
Army Council meeting which took that decision”.
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