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During the years of conflict one of the tactics deployed
by the British and Irish governments was that no one should talk to
republicans. This British-led strategy was premised on an approach, developed
through years of bitter colonial wars, that the objective must always be to
defeat the enemy. For successive British governments that meant the use of
extensive repressive legislation; a compliant judiciary and media; torture;
shoot-to-kill actions; counter-gangs (UDA and UVF); and the demonising of that
enemy. The Irish political and media establishment – with a very few honourable
exceptions - bought into this Self serving stupidity.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s I publicly and
repeatedly said that the politics of condemnation would achieve nothing. What
was needed was the creation of an alternative unarmed strategy. Republicans
were thinking, intelligent people who believed that armed struggle, in the
context that existed then, was the only means by which real political change
could be achieved. If that was to change then a realistic alternative was
needed. Establish that and other possibilities became feasible. That was the
essence of the argument I was putting.
As a result of conversations I was having at the
time with Fr. Des Wilson and Fr. Alex Reid we tried to engage with the Catholic
Hierarchy, the governments, and other parties to tease out what this
alternative process might look like.
Regrettably, with the exception of Archbishop,
later Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich, they weren’t for talking. The establishments were
committed to their approach which was to defeat republicans. Sinn Féin’s early
electoral successes in the 1982 Assembly election, in the 1983 Westminster
election and in the local government elections of 1985 only served to reinforce
this inflexible stance by the political and media establishments. Anything less
than the defeat of Irish republicanism was anathema to them. So was
dialogue.
In an attempt to open up a debate Fr. Reid wrote a
paper in July 1985 in which he sought to identify the military and political
conditions in which those republicans who were engaged in armed struggle would
examine an alternative. His focus was on getting agreement between the
nationalist parties around a united policy of aims and methods for solving the
conflict.
He laboriously handwrote copies of this proposal
and posted it off. He eventually spoke to the SDLP Deputy Leader Seamus Mallon
about meeting with me. At first Mr. Mallon indicated a willingness to consider
this but as time passed Fr. Reid suggested to Mallon that he was thinking of
approaching John Hume. Mallon told him not to and to give it another few weeks.
Meetings that were arranged were then cancelled. The British and Irish
governments signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 85 and in Westminster
by-elections in early 1986 Seamus Mallon won the Newry and Mourne seat. In
March Mr Mallon told the Sagart (Fr. Reid) that he would not meet me.
I bumped into the Sagart in the airport in the Basque country as he returned from his efforts for peace in that place.
This then was the background to the Sagart’s
decision to write directly to John Hume on 19 May 1986. In a long letter, he
set out his pastoral and moral obligations for writing. He wrote about our
conversations and of our commitment to finding an alternative to conflict and
gave John a real sense of what that alternative might be.
I thought it was a good first meeting. While we had
different political positions I found John very down to earth and easy to talk
to. Both of us agreed to go off and reflect on what had been said. I agreed to
relay our discussions back to the IRA and he said he would try to establish
whether the British government would be prepared to say the sort of things I
had suggested would be helpful. Looking back now I still find it hard to
believe that the process of dialogue took as long as it did. That was 1986. It
took another 12 years to get to the Good Friday Agreement.
In March 1988 the first of a series of leadership
meetings between the SDLP and Sinn Fein took place. While some progress was
made there remained significant gaps between us. The talks ended in September. Nonetheless
John and I weren’t for giving up. In the midst of atrocities by all sides, and
the perpetual political crisis that is the North, John and I continued to talk
quietly.
At Easter 1993 the story of our meetings broke in
the media. There was a storm of protest, condemnation, and vitriol almost all
aimed at John. The Irish and British political and media establishments were
outraged by John’s impertinence in breaking the consensus position of refusing
to speak to Republicans. Sections of the Dublin based media was especially
vitriolic toward John. Their attacks were personal, political and often just
abusive. The Independent Group of Newspapers led the charge. Day after day,
week after week thousands of words were written about John in the most hurtful,
cruel, and spiteful manner.
I know that he found much of this very difficult.
He was especially concerned at the impact on his family. But he refused to be
put off course.
One of John’s great strengths was his dogged
determination to see a thing through. He was convinced, as I was, that we were
both very serious and genuine about finding an alternative to armed actions.
Our shared objective was to agree a way forward that would see conflict ended
for good.
Unlike those who were condemning him John did not
live in a bubble divorced from ordinary people. He was a proud son of Derry who
was deeply connected with his community in ways that his critics could never
be. He knew many republican families – they were his neighbours. Although he
fundamentally disagreed with the IRA, and was opposed to their actions, he knew
that republicans were not criminals or gangsters but serious people who
believed in what they were doing. He and I were trying to find another way
forward.
John also faced criticism from within his own
party. Eddie McGrady MP once said: “Terrorism will not be defeated by
giving Sinn Féin a leg-up from the gutter.” This fitted with the
belief by some that he helped Sinn Féin at the cost of the SDLP. None of that
is true. The reality is that Sinn Féin was fit for purpose following the Good
Friday Agreement. The SDLP without John Hume was not.
Over the 12 years of our conversations, both secret
and public, I got to know John well. At his best he had an instinctive affinity
for people. Our conversations were never combative. He listened attentively to my opinions
while ably arguing his own views when we disagreed. We both came to believe in
each other’s commitment to the task we had set ourselves. John Hume made
a historic contribution to Ireland and to the future of our island. We are all
the better for his leadership. John was also a good singer. One of my
abiding memories is the two of us at my first White House St. Patrick’s Day
event in 1995 singing ‘The Town I love so well’ about his native city of Derry.
Together we cleared the building.
Singing in the White House
His wife Pat also deserves great credit. She was
John’s mainstay, his life partner and constant adviser and supporter. She
always made me welcome. Father Alex often told me that Pat was the biggest
influence on John and he often talked to her about our process. I thank her for
all she has done. Mó comhbhrón lei agus a clann. Agus leis an SDLP.
John’s contribution to Irish politics cannot be
underestimated. When others talked endlessly about peace John grasped the
challenge and helped make peace happen.
Ar dheis Dé go raibh a Á am dílis.
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